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DECIDING FOR OTHERS: NEW YORK LAW AND THE RIGHTS
OF INCOMPETENT PERSONS TO WITHHOLD OR
WITHDRAW LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

An incompetent patient's right to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment has been the subject of much legal, as well as medical,
ethical, and moral debate for over a decade.' Currently, New York, 2
Missouri,3 and Michigan4 are the only states where case law bars family
members from making medical decisions on behalf of incompetent
patients. There has been much controversy since New York's highest
court held that the standard required in cases dealing with life-sustaining
medical treatment for incompetent patients is "clear and convincing"
evidence that a now-incompetent patient had made a "firm and settled
commitment" while competent to withhold or withdraw such treatment. 5
Now, eight years later, a coalition of medical,6 civic, and religious7
groups is working to replace this court-created standard with a statute
allowing the families of incompetent patients to make medical decisions on
their behalf.' Although it has taken supporters of the Surrogate Decisionmaking bill three years to find a sponsor, the bill has been introduced in
the Senate and the Assembly. 9 The bill, however, faces significant
opposition." The introduction of this bill brings to the forefront once
again the controversial issue of whether artificial nutrition and hydration
should be distinguished from other forms of life-sustaining medical
treatment. I
Part II of this note discusses the background of an incompetent
person's right to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment,
1. See infra notes 25-27.
2. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
3. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
4. See Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
5. See In re Westchester County, 531 N.E.2d at 608.
6. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
8. See Gary Spencer, Bill Shifts the Role of Decision Maker to Patient's Family,
N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1995, at 1.
9. The bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Hannon and in the Assembly
by Health Committee Chairman Richard N. Gottfried. See S. 5020, 218th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995); A. 6791, 218th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
10. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 2; discussion infra part IV.B.
11. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 2.
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focusing primarily on the medical, ethical, and legal debate surrounding
whether persons in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) should have
nutrition and hydration withheld. Part III examines the response by the
New York State Legislature, including the enactment of a health care
proxy law in 1991 and the more recent introduction of a Surrogate
Decision-making bill which empowers surrogates to make decisions on
behalf of incompetent patients in life-sustaining medical treatment cases.
Part IV analyzes the public's response to this proposed legislation. It
identifies the proponents and opponents of the bill and their reasons for
their respective positions.
It proposes possible amendments to the
legislation that would establish better procedural safeguards for persons
who are in a PVS and also for persons who do not have family members
or close friends to act as surrogates. Part V concludes that decisions
regarding life-sustaining medical treatment are best made by family and
close friends of the patient. To the extent that the legislation empowers
families and friends and establishes guidelines for these surrogates to act
on an incompetent's behalf, it should be supported. However, it is critical
that better procedural safeguards be established to protect those persons
who are most vulnerable in our society. Without these safeguards, we run
the risk of legally empowering others to decide who should live and who
should die.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Death
Traditionally, the definition of death accepted by both physicians and
the lay public was the cessation of function of both the heart and the
lungs. 2 However, due to major advances in science, persons who at one
time would have been declared dead can now be kept alive by means of
a mechanical ventilator 3 and other medical interventions. ' 4 The advent
12. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAvIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE
MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 160 (1981)
[hereinafter DEFINING DEATH].

13. A ventilator is a medical device that assists or replaces the natural breathing
mechanisms. The terms ventilator and respirator are used interchangeably but ventilator
is currently the preferred term. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES
FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN AUTHORIZING OR WITHHOLDING LIFESUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT glossary (1991) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
14. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 12, at 160.
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of this new medical technology necessitated a redefining of the meaning
of death. 15
1. Brain Death
Brain death is defined as the irreversible loss of all brain functions,
both the higher levels of the brain (cerebral hemispheres) and the brain
stem. 16 The cerebral hemispheres contain the function of consciousness
or awareness, as well as other important voluntary and involuntary
actions, such as control of movements. 7 The brain stem, which is the
lower center of the brain, is responsible for vegetative functions, such as
respiration, heartbeat, and blood pressure and primitive stereotyped
reflexes, such as eye movements, pupillary response to light, and gag and
cough reflexes. 8 Many states, including New York, 9 through either
statutes or judicial decisions now recognize this irreversible loss of all
brain functions as the definition of death. 2

15. See id.
16. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at app. A chart; DEFINING DEATH, supranote
12, at 31-38; Ronald E. Cranford, The PersistentVegetative State: The Medical Reality
(Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb./Mar. 1988, at 27; Dana E.
Johnson, M.D., Withholding Fluids and Nutrition: Identifying the Populations at Risk,
2 ISSUES L. & MED. 189, 192-94 (1986).
17. See Cranford, supra note 16.

18. See id.
19. See People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984).
20. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 12, at 160.
The American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research have proposed the following model
statute, intended for adoption in every jurisdiction:
Uniform Determination of Death Act
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.
A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.
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2. Neocortical Death
Neocortical death has been defined as the irreversible loss of
consciousness and cognitive functions. 2 Thus, under this definition,
persons ina PVS could be declared "dead" even though the brain stem is
functioning. 2
Although some philosophers and physicians have
advocated that the whole brain death criterion should be replaced with this
"higher-brain" criterion,' this definition has not yet been legally
accepted by Western society.24
3. The Phenomenon of PVS
Most of the legal,' medical,'

and ethical debate, 27 as well as the

21. See David Randolph Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 850, 851 (1986).
22. See id. at 851 n.6.
23. See id. at 856-57. But see James L. Bernat, M.D., Brain Death: Occurs Only
With Destruction of the Cerebral Hemispheres and the Brain Stem, 49 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY 569 (1992) (discussing several flaws which render the higher-brain
formulation unsatisfactory as a concept of death); Baruch A. Brody, Ethical Questions
Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb./Mar. 1988,
af 33-J4 (stating that seeing a patient in a persistent vegetative state as dead would not
resolve the moral issues raised by these cases).
24. See Berat, supra note 23, at 570; Smith, supra note 21, at 852 (arguing that
neocortical death should be considered the death of the person for all legal purposes).
25. See James Bopp, Jr., Nutrition and Hydrationfor Patients:The Constitutional
Aspects, 4 IssuEs L. & MED. 3 (1988); Council on Scientific Affairs & on Ethical &
Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to
Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426, 428-29 (1990) [hereinafter Council
on Scientific Affairs].
26. See Sheldon Berrol, Considerationsfor Managementof the PersistentVegetative
State, 67 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 283 (1986); Brody, supra note
23; Cranford, supra note 16; Johnson, supra note 16.
27. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES
IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 171-96 (1983) [hereinafter FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT]; Daniel Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
1983, at 22; Patrick G. Derr, Nutrition and Hydration as Elective Therapy: Brophy and
Jobes from an Ethical and Historical Perspective, 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 25 (1986);
Willard Green, Setting BoundariesforArtificial Feeding, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec.
1984, at 8; Germain Grisez, Should Nutrition and HydrationBe Providedto Permanently
Unconscious and Other Mentally DisabledPersons?, 5 IsSUES L. & MED. 165 (1989);
Joanne Lynn & James F. Childress, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Food and Water?,
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vast majority of termination-of-treatment cases before the courts in recent
years have involved persons in a PVS.
PVS is caused by
overwhelming damage to the cerebral hemispheres of the brain.29 This
type of brain damage may result from a variety of diseases or traumas to
the brain, including stroke, cardiac arrest, poisoning, drug overdose,
direct physical injury, or degenerative disease.30
PVS is a form of eyes-open permanent unconsciousness. 3" It is
characterized by irreversible cessation of cognitive or higher functions of
the brain while brain stem functions, such as breathing, remain intact.32
Although many patients may initially require a ventilator to breathe, due
to an intact brain stem, they can usually begin breathing on their own
within a few days or weeks of the onset of the condition. 3 PVS
patients' eyes are open at times and they experience sleep wake cycles.' 4
They may smile, yawn, make unintelligible sounds and respond to loud
noises, but make no purposeful movements or meaningful
communication." Because their brain stems remain intact, most patients
in this state can maintain internal homeostasis, such as respiration,
REP., Oct. 1983, at 17; William E. May et al., Feeding and
Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 ISSUES L. &
MED. 203 (1987); Gilbert Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Againit the
Stream, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 11; Kevin O'Rourke, Should Nutrition
and Hydration Be Provided to Permanently Unconscious and Other Mentally Disabled
Persons?, 5 ISSUES L. & MED. 181 (1989); Daniel Wikler, Not Dead, Not Pying?
Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb./Mar.
1988, at 41.
28. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Mack v.
Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); Delio v.
Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1987).
29. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 25, at 427.
30. See id.
31. See George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from
Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 875, 879-80 (1996);
Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and
Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125 (1989)
[hereinafterAmerican Academy of Neurology].
32. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at app. A chart; Cranford, supra note 16, at
27-28; Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 25, at 427-28; Bryan Jennet & Fred
Plum, PersistentVegetative State After Brain Damage:A Syndrome in Search of a Name,
LANCET, April 1, 1972, at 734; Johnson, supra note 16, at 195.
33. See Cranford, supra note 16, at 28.
34. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at app. A chart; Cranford, supra note 16, at
28; Jennet & Plum, supra note 32, at 734; Johnson, supra note 16, at 195.
35. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 25, at 426.
HASTINGS CENTER
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circulation and heartbeat. 6 Due to their unconscious state, the patients
are unaware of themselves or their environment.37 They also lack the
capacity to experience pain or suffering because these are attributes of
consciousness. 38 Neurologists believe this phenomenon results from the
continued functioning of the brain stem even though there is total loss of
higher brain functioning. 39 By the current accepted definition of death,
these patients are not dead'W and, in most cases, can survive in this state
for many years, provided they are given proper nutrition and hydration.41
B. Life Supports - The Legal and Ethical Debate of Artificial
Nutrition and Hydration
According to the American Academy of Neurology, patients in a PVS
lose the capacity to chew and swallow in a normal manner because these
functions are voluntary, requiring intact cerebral hemispheres.4 2
However, other neurologists take the position that because these patients
have an intact involuntary swallowing reflex in addition to intactgag and
cough reflexes, it is theoretically possible, and in rare cases actually
possible, to feed them by hand.43 Nevertheless, because spoon-feeding
usually requires an enormous amount of time by either nursing staff or
36. See Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679-80 (App.
Div. 1987). Homeostasis is the dynamic process by which an organism maintains a
constant internal environment despite external changes. Examples of homeostatic
mechanisms include the regulation of blood pressure, body temperature, and blood sugar
levels. See

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, HOME MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

544 (1989).

See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 31, at 125.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
See American Academy of Neurology, supranote 31, at 125; see also Callahan,

supranote 27, at 22 (commenting that a denial of nutrition may, in the long run, become
the only effective way to ensure that a large number of biologically tenacious patients
actually die).
42. See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 31, at 125.
43. See, e.g., Cranford, supra note 16, at 31.
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families, most patients are given artificial nutrition and hydration 44
through a feeding tube known as a gastrostomy tube. 4
Most of the focus of debate over the past ten years in both the
courtroom 46 and medical, ethical, and legal literature47 has centered on
the controversial issue of whether artificial nutrition and hydration should
be considered basic nourishment or just another form of life-sustaining
medical treatment. A general consensus has been emerging among the
American Medical Association,' some prominent organizations and
commissions, 49 and many courts' that artificial nutrition and hydration
is not distinguishable from other forms of life-sustaining medical
treatment. 51 The Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in
Authorizing or Withholding Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment state in
pertinent part, "[a]rtificial nutrition and hydration are forms of medical
treatment; in general, their use or discontinuation should be governed by
the same principles and practices that govern other forms of medical
treatment."52 Some scholars go so far as to argue that persons in a PVS
are suffering from "the fatal pathology of being unable to chew and
swallow;"1 therefore, it is this fatal pathology and not the removal of
According to this
nutrition and hydration that causes their death.'
belief, removing a feeding tube is no different from removing a ventilator.
Many interested, reasonable, and concerned persons strongly reject the
decision to withhold nutrition and hydration. Arguments that have been
advanced in support of the notion that nutrition and hydration is
44. Artificial nutrition and hydration is the supplying of food and water through a
conduit such as a tube or intravenous line where the patient is not required to chew or
swallow voluntarily; it includes nasograstic tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous
infusions. See GUIDELINES, supranote 13, at glossary. Artificial nutrition and hydration
does not include assisted feeding such as spoon or bottle feeding. Id.
45. A gastrostomy tube is an enteral tube inserted through the patient's abdomen
into the stomach. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at glossary.
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
48. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 25, at 429 (stating the current
opinions of the American Medical Association on life-sustaining medical treatment);
Charles L. Sprung, M.D., ChangingAttitudes and Practicesin ForgoingLife-Sustaining
Treatments, 263 JAMA 2211 (1990).
49. See, e.g., FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 27, at 171-96.
50. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 118-21.
51. See id. at 120 n.188; Annas, supra note 31, at 883.
52. GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 120.
53. O'Rourke, supra note 27, at 183.
54. See Grisez, supra note 27, at 178.
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distinguishable from other forms of medical treatment and, therefore,
should not be removed from patients in a PVS include, but are not limited
to, the following: (1) food and water are universal human needs; modern
medical and surgical therapy are not;5' (2) withholding or withdrawing
nutrition and hydration would result in the patient's death by starvation
and dehydration rather than by the underlying disease or condition; 6 and
(3) because a person in a persistent vegetative state cannot experience pain
or suffering, a feeding tube cannot be considered burdensome to the
patient, thus, the benefit/burden analysis that is often invoked in favor of
removal fails. Therefore, removal becomes a choice to kill to end the
miserable state the patient is in rather than to relieve him of any
burden.
Vast disagreement is due in part to the fact that an infallible procedure
for diagnosing PVS has yet to be produced. 8 Although a diagnosis can
usually be made with a high degree of medical certainty,59 "there is no
broadly accepted, published set of specific medical criteria with as much
clinical detail and certainty as the brain death criteria. "I "Furthermore,
even the generally accepted criteria, when properly applied, are not
infallible."61 The fact that some patients have recovered varying degrees
of cognitive functions62 undermines the conclusion that all such patients
55. See Callahan, supra note 27, at 22; Derr, supra note 27, at 29; Lynn &
Childress, supra note 27, at 17; Meilaender, supra note 27, at 11.
56. See Bopp, supra note 25, at 43-46; May et al., supra note 27, at 209.
57. See Derr, supra note 27, at 36; Grisez, supra note 27, at 171; Meilaender,

supra note 27, at 13.
58. See Cranford, supra note 16, at 29-30; Wikler, supra note 27, at 46.
59. See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 31, at 126.
60. Cranford, supra note 16, at 29.

61. Id.
62. See W.F.M. Arts etal., UnexpectedImprovementAfter ProlongedPosttraumatic
Vegetative State, 48 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 1300 (1985)

(reporting unexpected gradual recovery of patient after being in PVS for approximately

two and one-half years); K. Higashi et al., Five-year Follow-up Study of Patients With

Persistent Vegetative State, 44 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 552
(1981); Harvey S. Levin et al., Vegetative State After Closed-HeadInjury, 48 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY 580 (1991); Gary A. Rosenberg, M.D., et al., Recovery of CognitionAfter

Prolonged Vegetative State, 2 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 167 (1977) (studying the cognitive

recovery of patient after being in PVS for one and one-half years); A Doctor Sees Hope

for "Hopeless" Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A16 (reporting that a woman
returns to consciousness after 15 months in a PVS and a doctor states that the fate of
these patients is simply too hard to predict to imply that recovery is impossible).
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have suffered brain damage that permanently precludes consciousness. 63
Some doctors further suggest that unexpected recoveries signify that the
diagnostic categories are not sufficiently well developed,' while another
suggests that it may mean that the diagnoses were made in error.65
These prognostic assessments are not free from controversy and,
therefore, any legal authority, whether a court or a legislature, that
attempts to establish guidelines for these cases must proceed with caution.
C. Case History
The right to decline life-sustaining medical treatment has been based
upon either the common-law right of self determination' or the
constitutional right to privacy or liberty.67 New York courts have
consistently applied the common law right of self determination in
deciding life-sustaining medical treatment cases.68
1. New York
In 1987, in Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center,69 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the wife of a patient in
a PVS, as conservator, was entitled to act in accordance with the patient's
prior clearly expressed wishes to discontinue the use of feeding and
hydration tubes.7" The court found clear and convincing evidence that
63. See FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 27, at 176-77;
Jeremy Brown, The Persistent Vegetative State: Time for Caution?, 66 POSTGRADUATE
MED. J. 697 (1990).
64. See, e.g., David C. Thomasma & Joel Brumlik, M.D., Ethical Issues in the
Treatment of Patients With a Remitting Vegetative State, 77 AM. J. MED. 373, 374
(1984).
65. See Berrol, supra note 26, at 283; NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE &
THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR OTHERS WITHOUT CAPACITY

61 (1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
66. See Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 685-86 (App.
Div. 1987).
67. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sed. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
68. SeeDelio, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 686 ("[The common-law right of self determination
with respect to one's body also forms the foundation for a competent adult patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment even if the effect is to hasten death." (citing Rivers
v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986))).
69. 516 N.Y.S.2d 677.
70. See id. at 693.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

the patient, while competent, had made statements to his close family
members regarding his strongly held beliefs on the quality of life and his
right to die. 7' Then, after looking to other states for guidance,' the
court concluded that nutrition and hydration should not be distinguished
from other forms of life-sustaining medical treatment.7 3 The Second
Department relied upon In re Storar,74 in which the court of appeals
stated that a court must focus primarily on the patient's desires and his
right to direct the course of his medical treatment rather than upon the
specific treatment involved.7 5
In 1988, the New York Court of Appeals decided the highly criticized
case of In re Westchester County Medical Center.76 The daughters of
Mary O'Connor, an incompetent elderly woman, refused to permit doctors
to insert in their mother a nasograstic feeding tube 7 needed to provide
nutrition and hydration.7"
The hospital petitioned the court for
permission to perform the procedure.79 The trial court denied the
hospital's application, concluding that it was contrary to the patient's
wishes, and the hospital appealed.' u The Appellate Division affirmed and
the hospital appealed by permission."' Upon review of the lower court's
record, the Court of Appeals concluded that the proof was not clear and
convincing that the patient had made a firm and settled commitment, while
competent, to decline the prescribed type of medical assistance under these
circumstances.' In doing so, the court noted that although the clear and
convincing evidence standard is stringent, and has pitfalls and inevitable
71. See id. at 682-83.
72. See id. at 688-89 (discussing decisions in New Jersey and Massachusetts
regarding nutrition and hydration).
73. See id. at 689.
74. 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y. 1981) (allowing respirator to be removed after finding

prior statements of patient in PVS to be clear and convincing).
75. See Delio, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 687-88.
76. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
77. A nasograstic tube is an enteral feeding tube inserted through a patient's nose,
down the esophagus, and into a patient's stomach. See GUIDELINES, supra note 18, at
glossary.
78. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d at 608.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id. at 611.
See id.
See id. at 614-15.
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uncertainties, it is the appropriate standard to ensure that a potential error
will be made on the side of life.'
The different outcomes in these cases suggest that one should be
critical of New York courts because what happens to an incompetent
person depends on the interpretation by courts of what the person said
when competent, to whom, and with what degree of vehemence.
2. U.S. Supreme Court - The Cruzan case
On January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was severely injured in an
automobile accident.14 When emergency personnel arrived, she was
without a pulse, but her respiration and heartbeat were restored with
resuscitative measures.' Nancy remained in a coma for approximately
three weeks and then began to show some signs of improvement.'
Although she was able to take her nutrition orally, a gastrostomy feeding
tube was implanted in order to assist her recovery and to ease the feeding
process.'
Efforts were made to rehabilitate Nancy over a substantial
period of time, but those efforts failed and she remained in a PVS.
After it became apparent that Nancy would not regain her mental faculties
(approximately five years after her accident), her parents asked the
hospital to remove her artificial nutrition and hydration. 9 When the
hospital refused to honor this request, her parents sought and received
approval from the state trial court for termination.' The Supreme Court
of Missouri reversed. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari,' and affirmed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme
Court.93
A majority of the Court found that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
83. See id. at 613.
84. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
85. See id.

86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 267.
90. See id. at 268.
91. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).

92. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
93. See id. at 287.
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nutrition and hydration.'
However, the Court refused to extend this
right unconditionally to an incompetent person and concluded that the
United States Constitution did not prohibit Missouri from requiring clear
and convincing evidence of a person's prior wishes concerning the
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment.9" Like
New York, the Supreme Court relies on how forthright a person was
when competent in stating his or her wishes.
3. Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The clear and convincing evidence standard required by New York,
Missouri, and Michigan, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, is an
example of a procedural safeguard that states may establish in lifesustaining medical treatment cases.96 This standard seeks to ensure that
the actions of a surrogate, acting on behalf of an incompetent person,
conform as closely as possible to the wishes expressed by the patient while
competent. 9 This standard, however, has been criticized as unworkable
and inhumane in practice.98 First, it is unworkable because it requires
persons to "forecast in advance what their medical conditions will be at
some future time and the treatments that will be available."19 Second,
because many adults will never sign a health care proxylo° or provide
clear and convincing evidence of their wishes,' the standard may deny
a large number of incompetent patients any right to death with
dignity." ° Furthermore, it does not give any legal weight to a family's
understanding of what the patient would want, or to the family's beliefs
as to which treatment will best serve the patient. 103
94. See id. at 279; Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Decide ifthe Dying Have a
Right to Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIM s, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al.

95. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 74.
99. Id.; accordIn re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988)

(Simons, J., dissenting).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
101. See TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 75.
102. See Cathaleen A. Roach, ParadoxandPandora'sBox: The Tragedyof Current
Right-To-Die Jurisprudence,25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133, 182 (1991).
103. See id.; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 74-75 (discussing reasons why

the clear and convincing evidence standard is unworkable and inhumane).
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New York State courts have expressed their reluctance to establish
policy in this area, stating that the obligation to do so rests with the
legislature, not the courts."°
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

A. Health Care Proxy Law
Soon after the Court of Appeals in Westchester County Medical Center
affirmed that clear and convincing evidence is the proper standard of proof
required in life-sustaining medical treatment cases, the New York
legislature adopted a health care proxy law,"te which went into effect
January 18, 1991. This proxy law allows patients to designate someone,
in writing, to make decisions on their behalf if they become
incapacitated.'"u However, to date, only fifteen to twenty percent of
New York State residents have used the proxy to choose an agent, leaving
the decision about termination of nutrition and hydration up to the
courts. 10 7
Now, the legislature-supported by various medical, 08
legal, 0 9 civic and religious, 1' and patients'
rights'
104. See Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 510 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (Sup.
Ct. 1986), rev'd, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1987).
In this most difficult area there seems to be but one unanimous
conclusion-legislatures are better suited than courts to balance the various
interests involved in determining whether to permit termination of care. The
legislature, possessing as it does, the broad plenary power to make laws and
regulation for public health, safety and welfare, are the elected representatives
of the people and as such reflect the collective will of the people.
Id.

105. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2980-83 (McKinney 1993).
106. See id. § 2981.
107. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 2.
108. Association for Hospital Risk Management; Association of Nursing Service
Administrators; Greater New York Hospital Association; Healthcare Association of New
York State; Medical Society of the State of New York; National Association of Social
Workers, New York Chapter; New York Academy of Medicine; New York Association
of Homes and Services to the Aging; New York Medical Directors Association; New
York State Health Facilities Association; New York State Hospice Association; New
York State Nurses Association; Western New York Institutional Ethics Committee
Network.
109. Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Health Law Committee - New
York State Bar Association; New York City Department for the Aging; New York
County Lawyers' Association, Elder Law Committee.
110. AARP; American Jewish Congress; Council of Churches; New York Civil
Liberties Union; Statewide Lutheran Advocacy; Women's City Club.
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organizations-has introduced a bill that will authorize family members or
close friends to make decisions on behalf of incompetent patients." 2
B. Surrogate Decision-Making Bill
1. Legislative Intent
Under article 29-C of the Public Health Law, a competent adult may
appoint an agent to make medical decisions for him in the event he
becomes incapacitated." 3 The proposed legislation will fill a gap that
remains in New York law."' It adds, among other things, a new article
29-D to the Public Health Law," 5 establishing a procedure to appoint a
surrogate" 6 empowered to make health care decisions for incompetent
patients who have neither appointed a proxy nor provided clear and
convincing evidence of treatment wishes." 7 Special procedures and
standards are provided for making decisions regarding life-sustaining
medical treatments." 8
Section 2995-D establishes procedures and guidelines for making
health care decisions for adult patients who lack capacity." 9 It lists, in
111. Alliance for the Mentally Ill; Association for Community Living; Brookdale

Center on Aging; Cancer Care; Center for Medical Consumers; Choice in Dying;
Coalition of Institutionalized Aged and Disabled; Coalition of New York State

Alzheimer's Association Chapters; Friends and Relatives of the Institutionalized Aged;
Gay Men's Health Crisis; Mental Hygiene Legal Services; Nassau County Long-Term

Care Ombudsmen Program; New York Citizens Committee on Health Care Decisions;
New York Foundation for Senior Citizens; New York State Association for Retarded
Children; New York State Chapter - Patient Representatives Society; New York

Statewide Senior Action Council; Nursing Home Community Coalition of New York
State.
112. See S. 5020, 218th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995); A. 6791, 218th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
113. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2981 (McKinney 1993); Memorandum in Support
of S. 5020, New York State Senate [hereinafter Senate Support Memo] (copy on file with
New York Law School Law Review).

114. See S. 5020 § 1; A. 6791 § 1.
115. See S. 5020 § 1; A. 6791 § 1.
116. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
117. See S. 5020 § 1; A. 6791 § 1.

118. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 2.
119. See id.; S. 5020 § 2; A. 6791 § 2.
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order of priority, the persons who may act as a surrogate. 2 The
section grants the surrogate authority to make all health care decisions on
the adult patient's behalf, subject to the standards and limitations of the
article.2 2
Although the section grants surrogates the authority to
consent to and to refuse treatment, it does not obligate health care
providers to offer or provide medically futile or inappropriate treatment
that they would have no duty to offer or provide to a competent
patient.
Health care providers have a duty to give the surrogate
medical information and clinical records necessary to make an informed

decision. 1
2. Decision-Making Standards
The surrogate is required to decide about treatment based on
knowledge of the patient's wishes, including the patient's religious and
moral beliefs or, if the patient's wishes are not reasonably known and
cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the
patient's best interests. 24 An assessment of the patient's best interests
shall include consideration of: (1) the dignity and uniqueness of every
person; (2) the possibility and extent of preserving the patient's life; (3)
the preservation, improvement or restoration of the patient's health or
functioning; (4) the relief of the patient's suffering; and (5) any medical
120. Those who are able to act as a surrogate include:
(A) A guardian authorized to decide about health care pursuant to article
eighty-one of the mental hygiene law or a guardian appointed under article
seventeen-A of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act;
(B) An individual, eighteen years of age or older, designated by another
otherwise qualified to act as the surrogate provided that no person on the
surrogate list objects to the designation;
(C) The spouse, if not legally separated from the patient;
(D) A son or daughter eighteen years of age or older;
(E) A parent;
(F) A brother or sister eighteen years of age or older;
(G) A close friend or close relative eighteen years of age or older.
S. 5020 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2995-D); A. 6791 § 2 (to be
codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-D).
121. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 2-3.
122. See id. at 3.
123. See id.
124. See id.; S. 5020 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-D);
A. 6791 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2995-D).
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condition and such other concerns and values as a reasonable person in the
patient's circumstances would wish to consider. " 5
A surrogate can consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment if treatment would be an excessive burden to the patient in light
of the patient's known wishes or best interests.' 26 In addition, one of
the following circumstances must exist: (i) the patient must be terminally
ill or permanently unconscious; 2 7 or (ii) treatment would involve such
pain or suffering or other burden that it would reasonably be deemed
inhumane or extraordinary; or (iii) the decision to withdraw or withhold
life-sustaining treatment accords with the patient's reasonably known
wishes.'
In residential health care facilities, a surrogate can decide to
forego life-sustaining treatment for patients who are not terminally ill or
permanently unconscious only if three members of the bioethics
committee, including at least one physician who is not directly responsible
for the patient's care, review the decision and determine that it meets the
standards set forth in the article for such decisions.' 29
According to the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law, 130 thousands of decisions are made every year in health care
facilities across New York State for patients who cannot decide for
themselves.'
"The question for New York State policy is not whether
surrogate decisions will be made, but who will make them and by what
criteria.""3
In practice, most health care providers consult family
members prior to rendering treatment to incompetent patients.' 33
However, under existing New York law, an adult patient must have signed
a health care proxy'34 or left clear evidence of his or her wishes in order
to forego life-sustaining treatment. 5 This standard is at odds with the
125. See S. 5020 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-D 5(b));
A. 6791 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-D 5(b)).
126. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 3.
127. Persons in a persistent vegetative state fall under the permanently unconscious
category. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at app. A chart.
128. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 3.

129. See id.
130. The Task Force has devised a proposal for legislation on surrogate decisions.
See TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 247.
131. See id. at 73.
132. Id.
133. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 8.
134. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83; TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 74.
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laws of several other states, where either statutes136 or court
decisions 3 7 expressly permit family members to decide about lifesustaining treatment, subject to public standards. New York's legislative
proposal recognizes that few families have the emotional or financial
resources to pursue judicial relief. 31 It establishes a process to review
sensitive cases and to resolve disputes within health care facilities, relying
on the courts only as a last resort. 139 According to the Guidelines for
State CourtDecisionMaking in Authorizing or Withholding Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment, "[t]he court should not be used as a clearinghouse for
the rendering of medical decisions which are best made by the patient and
the family and the physician of the patient."" A court should only be
involved in the event a disagreement arises among the patient's family and
the physicians or health care facility which cannot be resolved.'" This
proposed legislation is consistent with these guidelines.

136. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24 (Michie 1978); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35
(Michie 1977).
137. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill.
1990) (holding, inter
alia, that the guardian of an incompetent patient who is terminally ill and diagnosed as
irreversibly comatose may exercise right to refuse nutrition and hydration on behalf of
patient); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (holding, inter alia, that the right of a
patient in an irreversibly vegetative state to determine whether to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment may be exercised by patient's family or close friend); In re Fiori, 652
A.2d 1350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that a close family member, with the approval
of two physicians, may exercise the right of a person in a long-term persistent vegetative
state to terminate life-sustaining treatment even though a person's views were not
previously expressed).
138. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 8.
139. See id.
140. GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 36 & n.61; see also The Hon. Charles M.
Leibson, The Role of the Courts in Terminating Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 10
ISSUES L. & MED. 437 (1995).

141. See GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 36; see also Michele Yuen, Comment,
Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standardsfor SurrogateDecisionmaking, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 581, 600 (1992) ("Although several courts initially suggested that the judicial
system was the appropriate forum to decide whether life-sustaining [medical] treatment
could be withdrawn from an incompetent patient, courts have more recently declined to
require judicial intervention as a prerequisite to making such decisions.").
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IV. PUBLIC OPINION

The purpose of the bill is supported by many organizations' 42 as
well as by the public at large.143 Opinion polls suggest that a majority
of the public feels that a decision as important as whether to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from a loved one should be
decided by the patient's family rather than the courts.'
A. Proponents
The New York Association of Homes and Services for the Aging
(NYAHSA) 45 strongly supports this bill."6 According to NYAHSA,
many residents in health care facilities have neither a living will nor a
health care proxy and, in the absence of these protections, are forced to
rely on the courts for important treatment decisions. 47 Because the
adversarial nature of a court proceeding is usually an inappropriate setting
for making these sensitive decisions, the Association, among others,
believes that it is best if a patient's family or physicians make these
decisions without court intervention. 141
The Greater New York Hospital Association (GNYHA) also strongly
supports the bill. 149 It believes the legislation will clarify the confusion
that presently exists in New York State law on this issue. s° GNYHA
believes that the current law is in dire need of reform because, in part, it
leads to unwanted, unnecessary, and non-beneficial treatment.' 5,
It
142. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
143. See Roach, supranote 102, at 186-87 (discussing results of public opinion polls
taken shortly after the Cruzan decision).
144. See id.
145. NYAHSA represents more than 440 not-for-profit and public providers of long
term care, including residential health care facilities, adult care facilities, adult day care
programs, and home care providers. See Memorandum from NYAHSA in Support of
A. 6791 to Assembly Health Committee (n.d.) (on file with New York Law School Law
Review). Its members provide long term care to more than 250,000 of New York State's
frail elderly. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Memorandum from GNYHA in Support of A. 6791 to Members of the
Assembly Health Committee (May 8, 1995) (on file with New York Law School Law
Review).
150. See id.
151. See id.
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supports the fact that the legislation does not distinguish artificial nutrition
152
and hydration from other forms of life-sustaining medical treatment.
B. Opponents
The New York State Catholic Conference 5 ' supports the spirit of
the bill, 54 but opposes the bill in substance precisely because it does not
distinguish nutrition and hydration from other forms of medical
treatment. 155 The Conference strongly believes that nutrition and
56
hydration provide basic nourishment, rather than medical care.'
Furthermore, it acknowledges both the disagreement among ethicists about
when it is morally permissive to withhold or withdraw nutrition and
hydration, and the disagreement among physicians about when such
withdrawal is medically appropriate. 7 In the absence of unanimity, the
Conference has decided that these decisions should be guided by a
presumption in favor of continuing nutrition and hydration, unless the
continued treatment itself is an excessive burden on the patient. 58
Moreover, it emphasizes that the New York legislature has acknowledged
the higher standards that must be afforded decisions pertaining to artificial
nutrition and hydration. 9 New York's current Health Care Agents and
Proxies law states that an agent is not authorized to make decisions
regarding nutrition and hydration unless the patient's wishes are
152. See id.
153. The New York State Catholic Conference is the public policy office of the 26

Roman Catholic Bishops in the state. It is responsible for the development, coordination,
and communication of the Bishops' positions on critical public policy issues. See Letter
from New York State Catholic Conference to the Honorable Richard Gottfried,
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Health 1 (May 8, 1995) [hereinafter Gottfried Letter]

(on file with New York Law School Law Review). It is intimately involved in crafting
sound public policies which respond to pressing human needs and serve the common
good of all people in the state. See id.
154. See Gottfried Letter, supranote 153; New York Academy of Med., Surrogate
Decision-Making Presentation (May 17, 1995) (on file with New York Law School Law

Review).
155. See Gottfried Letter, supranote 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra

note 154, at 3.
156. See Gottfried Letter, supranote 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra
note 154, at 3.
157. See New York Academy of Med., supra note 154, at 3.

158. See id.
159. See Gottfried Letter, supranote 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra
note 154, at 3.
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reasonably known or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained."
The Conference believes that a higher standard in law is warranted for
such a sensitive and critical decision and should be included in the
proposed legislation.' 6 ' This is imperative, it says, particularly because
surrogates are being designated by law 62 and not by patients.'63 It
also emphasizes that the legislation does not sufficiently protect from
potential abuses those patients who have either outlived or been abandoned
by their families." 6
Agudath Israel of America 165 supports and opposes the bill on
basically the same grounds as the Conference. 66 However, its main
concern is with the concept of "personal autonomy" and how the trend of
recent legal developments appears to be moving inexorably in a direction
that places "greater emphasis on the quality of human life and less on the
inherent sanctity of human life." 67 It fears this trend is leading society
down a "slippery slope." 6 1 The argument warns against "taking a first
step that is itself ethically justified when doing so is expected to lead to the
acceptance of other actions that are not likewise justified. " 6 "If the
slope is indeed slippery and no likely stopping points exist to provide a
toehold, then the wisest course may be to avoid taking the first step."'7 0
160.
161.
note 154,
162.
163.
note 154,
164.
note 154,
165.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982-2 (McKinney 1993).
See Gottfried Letter, supranote 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra
at 3.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See Gottfried Letter, supra note 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra
at 3.
See Gottfried Letter, supra note 153, at 2; New York Academy of Med., supra
at 2.
Agudath Israel of America is a national grassroots Orthodox Jewish movement

which has long been interested in developments in bio-medical ethics. See Memorandum
from Agudath Israel of America to Senate Majority Leader Joseph L. Bruno et al. 1
(June 14, 1995) [hereinafter Agudath Israel] (on file with New York Law School Law
Review).
166. See id.
167. Id. at2.

168. Id. at 5; see also TamaraLewin, FightforLife of a Hopeless, Brain-Damaged

Man Goes to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1996, at A8.
169. FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 27, at 28.
170. Id. For articles discussing the "slippery slope" argument see Green, supra
note 32, at 9; Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Tom
Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise ofReligion, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 490, 509
(1992); Robert Steinbrook, M.D., & Bernard Lo, M.D., Artificial Feeding - Solid
Ground, Not a Slippery Slope, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 286 (1988).
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Agudath Israel expresses its fear that this legislation would bring us "one
step closer to the bottom of the slope."171
The bill is also opposed by the New York State Trial Lawyers
Association." 7 While it supports the purpose of the bill, it objects to
two sections that it says "confers overly broad civil immunity"" on
physicians, ethics committees, and health care facilities when they act on
surrogate decisions made pursuant to the bill. 174
C. Possible Amendments
The critical importance of living wills and health care proxies cannot
be emphasized enough. They are the best means available to enforce
one's wishes in the event one becomes incapacitated. However, only a
very low percentage of New York State residents have living wills or have
actually designated a proxy.175 This may be because the public is
unaware of the current state of the law regarding health care decisions,
unwilling to consider such tools as health care proxies or simply' not
willing to think about sickness while in good health. Whatever the reason,
some other means of enforcing one's "probable" wishes needs to be
established. This is the goal of New York's proposed legislation. 176
Family and friends are often in the best position to know one's beliefs,
values, and preferences and, therefore, they should be appointed to make
decisions in the event a loved one becomes incapacitated. That this view
is widely shared is evidenced by the numerous supporters of the bill. 77
However, although the bill does establish some procedural safeguards
regarding decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment (i.e., it provides for a limited application and establishes ethics
review committees)' 78 there still remains potential for abuse in practice.
First, it is possible that family members may not always act in the
171. Agudath Israel, supra note 165, at 5.
172. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 2.
173. Id.
174. See S. 5020, 218th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1995) (holding medical
professionals to a "good faith" standard) (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2995-0); A. 6791, 218th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1995) (to be codified at N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-0).
175. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 2.
176. See Senate Support Memo, supra note 113, at 2.
177. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
178. See S. 5020 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2995-D 6(a),
2995-M); A. 6791 § 2 (to be codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2995-D 6(a), 2995-

M).
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patient's best interest. "Family members, although they may care for the
patient, can be influenced by their own viewpoints about death and quality
of life."" 9 Additionally, some family members may be motivated by
interests other than those of the patient, such as severe financial and
emotional burdens." 8
Second, patients' families may be easily
influenced by physicians who believe that a diagnosis of PVS can be made
with a high degree of medical certainty within one to three months.' 8'
In many cases, the fate of these patients is unpredictable l" because an
infallible procedure for diagnosing PVS has not yet been developed. 8 "
Furthermore, although the bill establishes ethics committees'1 to review
cases and to act on behalf of patients without families, unless these
committees are chosen carefully, their contribution may be less than
helpful because they may be biased, uneducated, and ignorant regarding
ethics in particular."
Therefore, better safeguards need to be
established.
Despite ethical and moral objections of some groups, there appears to
be an emerging consensus that nutrition and hydration is indistinguishable
from other forms of life-sustaining medical treatment."IM However,
because questions remain about the accuracy of prognostic assessments of
persons in" a PVS and because cases of recovery have been
"reported, " the legislature should provide additional safeguards.
Amending the bill to provide a provision granting the surrogate the right
to withdraw nutrition and hydration from persons in a PVS only in cases
where the person has been continuously unconscious for a period of three
179. Bopp, supra note 25, at 27.

180. See FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 27, at 185. But see
Grisez, supra note 27, at 172 ("In our affluent society, can we justify abandoning the
comatose in order to save the cost of caring for them as we care for others who cannot
care for themselves?").
181. See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 31, at 126.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
183. See Cranford, supra note 16, at 29; Wikler, supra note 27, at 46.
184. Section 2995-M does set forth some requirements for the composition of these
committees. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-M.

185. See Green, supra note 27, at 8-9 (raising caution as to ethics committees).
186. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
187. In just one facility alone, there are quite a few patients that have recovered
some degree of cognitive awareness after being in a persistent vegetative state for about
two to three years. Their original prognoses was that they would never regain any
cognitive function. These cases have never been "officially" reported, which may be the
case with many other patients in facilities all around the nation. Informal Interviews by
Author with Patients' Families at Seaview Hospital Rehabilitation Center & Home, Staten
Island, New York (Oct. 15, 1995).
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or more years'88 would better ensure that nutrition and hydration is not
being removed from persons who may recover.
Further, providing a special provision to protect patients residing in
health care facilities who do not have family or close friends to act as
surrogates would avoid the possibility of institutional bias by ethics
committees.1 9 One alternative may be to create a state ombudsman
program similar to the one in effect in New Jersey."9 Whenever lifesustaining treatment is to be withheld or withdrawn either to effectuate an
incompetent patient's wishes or because it is considered to be in the
patient's best interest, the state ombudsman must be notified.' 9 "The
ombudsmen is required to treat every notification that life-sustaining
treatment will be withheld or withdrawn from an institutionalized elderly
patient as possible abuse. " " Another alternative may be to create an
independent office which is not subject to facility control or influence, to
act as "watchdog" in these cases.193
V. CONCLUSION

As medical technology becomes more advanced, decisions regarding
medical treatment for loved ones which were once troublesome have now
Therefore, it is essential that the
become nearly insurmountable.
that will provide adequate and
statute
legislature enact a responsible
appropriate guidance. The proposed legislation is commendable because
it recognizes that these critical decisions should be made by the patient's
family rather than by a judge unfamiliar with the patient. However, the
legislation fails to sufficiently protect those most vulnerable in our
society-persons diagnosed as being in a PVS and persons who do not
have family to care for them-from possible abuses. The legislation
should be amended to address this critical issue.
In all cases there should be a presumption in favor of life through
continued treatment. There will never be a "right" or "clear" answer to
the question of when to withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration from
a person in a PVS. Courts cannot duplicate the knowledge and love of
families watching a patient suffer. Therefore, it is families who must
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Nancy Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 62, 71.
See Green, supra note 27, at 8-9.
See Bopp, supra note 25, at 26.
See id.

192. Id.; see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 2412.5 (West 1983) (outlining procedures for
investigating decisions made by a surrogate on behalf of incompetent patients).
193. See New York Academy of Med., supra note 154, at 3.
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make the decision to hold on or to forego hope." 9 What is needed from
the legislature are responsible guidelines to help make the best choice in
the unfortunate event that a choice must be made.
Marina Martino

194. See Donald D. Tresch, M.D., et al., Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State:
Attitudes and Reactions of Family Members, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 17, 19-21
(1991).

